Two weeks of negotiations in London produced solid technical groundwork and a clear political picture. Although formal adoption was not the outcome, the NZF held.

Two weeks of negotiations in London produced solid technical groundwork and a clear political picture. Although formal adoption was not the outcome, the NZF held, the financial architecture survived, and the clean fuel pathways our sector depends on remain central to the deal.

International shipping is responsible for roughly 3% of global greenhouse gas emissions. The International Maritime Organization (IMO), the United Nations body that regulates it, has been working for years to bring those emissions to net-zero by 2050 through a landmark regulatory package: the IMO Net-Zero Framework, or NZF.

Over two weeks in April and May 2026, the latest chapter in that effort unfolded at IMO headquarters in London. The first week, the 21st Intersessional Working Group on GHG Emissions (ISWG-GHG 21) was the technical session, focused on how the framework would function in practice. The second week, the 84th session of the Marine Environment Protection Committee (MEPC 84) was the political committee where the strategic decisions are made.

The e-NG Coalition attended both sessions in full and tracked every workstream. This is our read of what happened, what it means, and what comes next.

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ISWG-GHG 21: the technical architecture matures

The working group convened on 20 April under Chair Oftedal (Norway) with a dense technical agenda. Five workstreams dominated the week: the rules for calculating a ship's GHG Fuel Intensity (GFI), the Sustainable Fuel Certification Scheme (SFCS), a compliance registry, the zero- and near-zero-emission (ZNZ) reward mechanism, and the life cycle assessment (LCA) framework that underpins the whole methodology.

By Friday 24 April, the framework's technical foundations were materially stronger than they had been at the start of the week. Several outcomes were particularly important for the clean maritime fuel sector:

• The SFCS is now the most mature component of the entire NZF. It preserves mass-balance accounting, the approach that allows clean fuels, including bio-LNG and synthetic methane, to be certified and traded at scale using existing infrastructure. For a sector where the physical distribution network is already built around LNG, this matters enormously.

• The ZNZ reward mechanism, the financial engine that would channel revenues toward vessels using genuinely low-emission fuels advanced with UK/Norway and China submissions adopted as the joint basis for further work. The reward framework explicitly contemplates differentiation between fuel types and production pathways, which is directly relevant to the competitive positioning of e-NG and bio-LNG.

• Well-to-wake (WtW) accounting was preserved across all emission estimates and projections. This methodology measures emissions across the full lifecycle of a fuel from production, through distribution, to combustion rather than only at the point of use. It is the foundation on which genuinely clean fuels receive credit for their full environmental benefit.

• A new pathway code for LNG combined with upstream carbon capture and storage (CCS) was endorsed without significant debate. This is one to watch: if permanence and traceability requirements are not written carefully in the LCA guidelines, this pathway could dilute the competitive advantage of genuinely renewable fuels.

• The Net-Zero Fund, the financial mechanism that would direct revenues toward the maritime energy transition remained within scope, despite procedural attempts by a coalition of countries including the UAE, Liberia, Russia, Saudi Arabia, and the United States to delay or separate its governing provisions. The Fund's architecture was not stripped out.

One significant risk crystallized during the technical week. Japan has been promoting what it calls 'Option 2': a proposal to soften the framework's ambition targets enough to allow ships running on conventional fossil LNG to comply without switching fuels. This proposal remains politically alive and, if ultimately adopted, would remove the central incentive for the sector to transition toward bio-LNG and synthetic methane.

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MEPC 84: the political landscape takes shape

MEPC 84 opened on 27 April. The agenda covered sixteen items, but the center of gravity was the debate on the NZF under Agenda Item 7 Part 2, which ran across Wednesday 29 April and Thursday 30 April. Representatives from 106 countries took the floor. No vote was called; no adoption decision was made, but the political map became significantly clearer.

Three distinct blocs emerged:

• The adoption coalition, led by the European Union (now fully re-coordinated after divisions at MEPC ES2), the Pacific Small Island Developing States, Tuvalu, Fiji, Marshall Islands, Cook Islands, Tonga and others. Canada, and a materially strengthened African group. These delegations came prepared to defend the NZF as agreed and to press for adoption on the agreed timeline. The legal obligations argument deployed by Tuvalu that failure to adopt the NZF may carry significant international legal consequences given binding 1.5°C alignment obligations was the sharpest new framing of the session.

• The deferral and re-open coalition built around Saudi Arabia (MEPC 84/7/30), Argentina, Liberia and Panama (MEPC 84/7/38), and the United States. This group pushed for alternative architectures and broader revisions. Crucially, it could not agree among itself on what it wanted instead, which fundamentally limited its ability to replace the NZF. Of the 106 delegations who took the floor, 24 supported the Argentina/Liberia/Panama alternative (22.6%) and 7 supported Japan's proposal (6.6%). Combined, 31 states representing 29.2% of the floor not enough to form a simple majority, let alone the two-thirds required for a MARPOL amendment adoption vote.

• The bridge-builders: Brazil, Japan, Singapore, Chile, China, Cyprus, Indonesia, and the Democratic Republic of Congo sought convergence without committing to either camp. Brazil's intellectual contribution (MEPC 84/7/34 and 84/7/37) on reward design and the preservation of momentum was particularly substantive. Japan's dual-option paper (84/7/49) kept the possibility of negotiated refinements on the table, albeit at the cost of naming a target-relaxation option that the adoption coalition firmly rejected.

Regional dynamics shifted meaningfully. Africa moved from fragmented to coordinated: twelve African states supported the NZF in the floor debate, five of which Angola, Egypt, Madagascar, Nigeria, and Somalia had voted for adjournment at the extraordinary session in October 2025 and now returned to the adoption coalition. The African Union Commission and MOESNA both formally intervened in support of the NZF. The EU re-coordinated fully, with Greece and Cyprus back in the adoption camp after their October 2025 abstentions. The Marshall Islands, the world's third-largest flag state by gross tonnage, re-anchored firmly in the adoption group.

The IMO Secretary-General closed Agenda Item 7 Part 2 with the assertion that the organization was 'right back on track.' The framing is best read as institutional message-management a deliberate signal to industry and capitals that the global regulatory process is functioning, and that fragmentation through regional measures should be resisted. The underlying procedural reality is more nuanced, but the message serves our sector's interest in maintaining a single global framework.

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What the official record says

The MEPC 84 draft report records four official conclusions from the Chair's summary on the NZF: the exchange of views was noted; the renewed commitment to cooperating toward a global measure was affirmed; the intersessional working arrangements would be strengthened; and all delegations were invited to continue work intersessionally. Critically, the alternative proposals were recorded in the report but were not integrated into the NZF amendment text. The NZF remains in the document from which future negotiations proceed.

Under Agenda Item 14 (work program), the Committee approved two additional intersessional working groups, ISWG-GHG 22, expected in September 2026, and ISWG-GHG 23, before MEPC 85 with a three point mandate: refine the draft MARPOL Annex VI amendments in line with the 2023 IMO GHG Strategy; advance the implementation guidelines; and develop the LCA framework. The resumed MEPC Extraordinary Session is expected in December 2026 during MEPC 85.

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The revised timeline — and what it means for investment

The working assumption heading into MEPC 84 was that the resumed MEPC ES2 in autumn 2026 would deliver formal adoption of the NZF. That assumption needs to be revised.

The more likely path now, based on the breadth and nature of the concerns raised through the ISWG process, is that December 2026 produces approval of a materially revised NZF text not formal adoption. Under MARPOL rules, adoption must follow at least six months after approval in principle. If the revisions are deemed material, the revised text would need to be re-circulated before it can be adopted, pushing formal adoption into 2027 and the Net-Zero Fund's operational date to 2028-2029 at the earliest.

This is not a collapse of the NZF. It is a timeline shift, and an important distinction. The framework survived; the financial architecture survived; the clean fuel pathways survived. But investors, project developers, and fuel producers calibrating decisions against an autumn 2026 adoption date need to adjust their baseline. The realistic planning scenario is now: revised NZF approval in December 2026; formal adoption in 2027; Fund operational from 2028 onwards.

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What this means for e-LNG, bio-LNG and e-NG

For the renewable methane pathways in shipping, the net assessment from these two weeks is positively qualified by the timeline shift and three specific risks that will define the next phase of negotiations.

On the positive side: the NZF, with its GFI pull-up, Net-Zero Fund, and ZNZ reward mechanism, remains in the central document. This is the financial and regulatory architecture that makes bio-LNG and e-NG commercially viable at scale — by creating a compliance incentive to migrate away from fossil LNG, and by channeling revenues toward the vessels and fuel producers at the frontier. The SFCS framework, which enables mass-balance certification of clean methane pathways, is mature and advancing. The WtW methodology, which gives full lifecycle credit to clean fuels, was preserved. And ISWG-GHG 21 endorsed a methane slip measurement methodology (Option C: reference corrected to ISO 23306 LNG average) that is competitively neutral for e-methane versus fossil LNG.

The three risks to manage through the ISWG cycle are:

• Japan's Option 2, target relaxation so that conventional fossil LNG complies with the GFI limits without switching fuels. This is the single most consequential technical risk to the e-NG investment case. If adopted, it removes the WtW pull-up that creates the migration economics driving investment in bio-LNG and e-methane. The adoption coalition rejected it in plenary; it remains live in the ISWG negotiations.

• The Argentina / Liberia / Panama alternative (MEPC 84/7/38) a technically permissive alternative that is rhetorically friendly to LNG ('technology-neutral') but removes the Fund and the reward mechanism. It keeps fossil LNG legal while defunding the transition. Eight further delegations endorsed at MEPC 84. It will be the primary alternative proposition in ISWG-GHG 22 and 23.

• The separate-Fund-instrument framing a push by UAE and Russia to have the Net-Zero Fund established as a separate treaty rather than as an integral part of the MARPOL amendment. If this gains traction, the Fund's operational date slips materially beyond 2028, removing the near-term investment signal the sector needs.

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What comes next

The ISWG cycle between now and December 2026 is where the practical outcome will be decided. Three priority areas for the e-NG Coalition's engagement:

• To help written submissions to ISWG-GHG 22 (deadline expected mid-July 2026): bio-LNG and e-LNG production volume evidence to rebut the fuel-availability deficit narrative; carbon source retention requirements for e-methane; SFCS grandfathering protections; permanence and traceability standards for LNG+CCS; ISO equivalence for actual emission factors.

• Bilateral program: priority engagement with Japan on Option 2, Singapore on the bridge-builder principles, Brazil on reward design, China on anti-fragmentation, and the African Group on cost-of-capital and ZNZ reward differentiation building on the DRC's strong framing of these issues during MEPC 84.

• Investment timeline alignment: members re-calibrating project finance should use: NZF revised text approval December 2026; formal adoption 2027; Fund operational from 2028. Stress-testing FID decisions in 2026 H2 and 2027 against this revised baseline is the immediate priority.

MEPC 84 did not deliver the adoption moment the maritime decarbonization community was working toward. But the framework held. The financial architecture that makes clean shipping fuels commercially viable survived. The opposition failed to consolidate. Regional coordination across the EU, Africa, the Pacific, and the Caribbean strengthened materially. And the NZF remains the only document with majority support as the basis for a MARPOL amendment which, given IMO procedural rules, gives the adoption coalition a structurally strong position heading into the ISWG cycle.

• The challenge now is not preserving the framework. That battle was largely won in London. The next challenge is ensuring that what gets agreed in December 2026 and adopted in 2027 is a framework that delivers real investment certainty, genuine environmental integrity, and scalable pathways for the clean fuels the global fleet will need. For the renewable methane sector, that means bio-LNG and e-NG as central, not marginal, parts of the compliance architecture.

The e-NG Coalition will be present and active in every step of the process ahead.

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The e-NG Coalition tracks IMO negotiations on behalf of companies and organizations developing and deploying e-NG and e-LNG pathways in maritime shipping. For questions about this analysis or Coalition membership, contact: mariana.tostes@eng-coalition.org

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